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Abstract
Bilateral trade imbalances are determined by aggregate trade imbalances, pro-
duction and expenditure patterns, and trade barriers. We calibrate a dynamic
many-sector trade model to match the recent sectoral trade and production
shares of 40 economies and the rest of the world. Through a variance decompos-
ition and counterfactuals, the model allows us to assess the relative importance
of these determinants for the observed variation in bilateral imbalances. Large
pairwise asymmetries in residual trade “wedges” are needed for the model to
match the data. These account for roughly 60% of the variation, with most of
the rest due to differences in production and expenditure patterns. Aggregate
trade imbalances play a minor role. A counterfactual trade policy which elim-
inates trade-wedge asymmetries would have sizeable effects on bilateral trade
patterns and welfare. However, it would leave aggregate trade balances virtu-
ally unchanged.
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1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that the U.S. trade balance has been in deficit every year
since 1992. In the five years between 2010 and 2014, that deficit amounted to 3% of
GDP. What is perhaps less well known is that the overall U.S. deficit masks significant
heterogeneity of its trade balance with individual partner countries. The vertical bars
in Figure 1 represent the U.S. trade balance (as a percentage of U.S. GDP) vis-à-vis
39 other economies and the rest of the world (RoW) over the period 2010-2014.1
There is significant variation in U.S. bilateral balances around their average value,
represented by the thick horizontal line.2 The U.S. runs large bilateral deficits with
China, and its NAFTA partners Mexico and Canada − but it also runs small trade
surpluses with a number of other economies, including Ireland, the Netherlands and
France.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Such dispersion in a country’s bilateral balances with its trade partners is not
peculiar to the U.S. case. Each light-blue dot in Figure 2 represents the trade balance
of the horizontal-axis country with one of its trade partners (as a percentage of the
horizontal-axis country’s GDP). The large black dot represents the horizontal-axis
country’s average bilateral balance. As the figure shows, the differences between the
bilateral balances of individual countries with their partners are significantly larger
than the differences in average bilateral balances across countries. Yet so far there
exists no formal study which attempts to account for the large observed variation in
trade balances across country pairs − despite the fact that specific examples of major
imbalances between trade partners are a recurrent trigger of political controversies.3
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The present paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature. We set up a dynamic
many-country, many-sector quantitative trade model. This model is combined with
sectoral-level data on production, spending and trade for 40 countries and the rest of
the world from the World Input Output Database (WIOD). Through a static variance
decomposition and (with stronger assumptions) through fully-fledged counterfactuals,
we are able to show that a large share of of the variation in bilateral trade balances
1The figure is based on data from the 2016 release of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD).
Section 3 discusses our data sources in detail.
2Since the data represented in Figure 1 covers the total value of all U.S. exports and imports
divided across 40 countries/regions, the average bilateral trade balance equals the overall U.S. trade
balance divided by 40.
3In the last three decades, the U.S. trade deficit vis-à-vis Japan (Janow, 1994), China (Feenstra
et al., 1998; Hughes, 2005) and, most recently, Germany (Swanson, 2017; Krugman, 2017) has been
in the spotlight as a possible symptom of unfair trade practices on the part of these countries against
American producers.
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is the result of observed differences in country’s aggregate trade balances, spending
patterns and industrial structure. Nevertheless, over half of the variation in bilateral
balances remains unexplained − and our model attributes it to pairwise asymmetric
impediments to trade.
There are three possible reasons why trade balances may vary across country pairs.
First, differences in aggregate trade balances may give rise to pairwise differences in
bilateral balances: by definition, overall-deficit countries − such as the U.S. − will
have a deficit with their average trade partner; overall-surplus countries − such as
China − will have a surplus. Everything else constant, we would thus expect a deficit-
surplus pair to have a larger trade imbalance than two surplus or two deficit countries.
Second, differences in sectoral expenditure and production patterns may give rise to
bilateral imbalances: if a large portion of Dutch expenditure is dedicated to goods
produced by the U.S., a large portion of German expenditure to goods produced
by the Netherlands, and a large portion of U.S. expenditure to goods produced by
Germany, the resulting “triangular trade” may give rise to bilateral imbalances even in
the absence of overall trade surpluses and deficits. Third and finally, systematically
asymmetric obstacles to trade between two countries may penalise bilateral trade
flows in one direction more than in the other.
Our calibrated model allows us to capture all three explanations for bilateral trade
imbalances. We use the model’s preference and technology parameters to match
counties’ aggregate trade surpluses and deficits perfectly, and to explain as much of
countries’ sector-level patterns of spending, production and trade as possible. The
remaining gap between the model and the data is ascribed to the presence of broadly
defined trade “wedges” at the country-pair-sector level. These wedges may represent
technological and policy barriers to trade, as well as preference differences across
countries which could reduce the gains from trade in some sectors. Our calibration
treats them as a “residual,” explaining the portion of the value of a country’s import
from its trade partner which cannot otherwise be accounted for. In order to match
all flows of goods and services perfectly, we need to allow for these wedges to be
potentially asymmetric: in a given sector, the import wedge faced by one country
from another may differ from the wedge faced by the second from the first. In a
standard quantitative trade model, these three features of the data span all possible
explanations for (differences in) bilateral trade imbalances: if there were no aggregate
trade surpluses and deficits, if all countries’ production and expenditure patterns
were the same, and if trade wedges were symmetric within country pairs, all bilateral
balances would be identically equal to zero.
Having devised a model which perfectly matches all sector-level bilateral trade
flows, we first carry out an accounting exercise which decomposes the observed vari-
ation in bilateral trade balances into the individual and combined effects of the three
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drivers described above. We find that overall trade surpluses and deficits on their
own account for a small share of the variance (roughly 2%). The individual contri-
bution of triangular trade is sizeable (roughly 12%), but the largest individual share
is due to asymmetries in trade wedges (roughly 38%). The remainder of the vari-
ance is due to differences in the so-called “multilateral resistance terms”, which reflect
the interactive effect of all three. This static accounting decomposition provides a
first indication that asymmetries in trade wedges are required to explain a signific-
ant portion of differences in trade imbalances across country pairs. The asymmetries
do not appear to be systematically related to country-pair characteristics, and their
quantitative importance changes little over time.
To investigate the role of trade-wedge asymmetries further, we perform counter-
factuals which allow us to investigate the distribution of bilateral trade balances in a
world of (more) symmetric trade wedges. These counterfactuals capture the impact
of trade-wedge symmetry on “multilateral resistance” as well as general-equilibrium
effects on global investment patterns and aggregate trade balances. For the latter,
we rely on the intertemporal component of our model, which assumes that capital is
internationally mobile and allows for trade surpluses and deficits to arise in steady
state as the result of differences in countries’ production technologies and intertem-
poral preferences.
We show that, in a counterfactual world economy with completely symmetric
wedges, 60% of the variation of bilateral trade balances would disappear. However,
aggregate trade balances would remain virtually unchanged. As a result, countries’
overall trade surpluses and deficits are merely distributed more evenly across their
trade partners. Our results indicate that most of the remaining differences in bilateral
balances in this world are the result of “triangular trade”. We also find that the global
move to trade-wedge symmetry would have sizeable effects on countries’ real GDPs
and consumption levels. Taken together, these findings imply that the model-implied
trade-wedge asymmetries are significant for bilateral trade patterns and welfare −
and may require further study.
Bilateral trade imbalances have received surprisingly little attention in academic
research. Two notable exceptions are Feenstra et al. (1998), and Davis and Weinstein
(2002). Feenstra et al. (1998) focus exclusively on the case of the U.S. trade deficit
with China, whereas Davis and Weinstein (2002) analyse bilateral imbalances for a
large sample of countries. Their work is most closely related with ours. They provide
rough calculations of “theory-predicted” bilateral imbalances, relying on the gravity
model of trade, and contrast them with the actual imbalances observed in the data.
As we show, their calculations are not inconsistent with the theoretical framework we
employ − in which the values of sector-level trade flows between countries also obey a
gravity equation −, but they are incomplete since their gravity equation is not derived
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from a fully microfounded quantitative model.4 Moreover, Davis and Weinstein focus
exclusively on trade in goods, while use of WIOD data allows us to cover the total
value of countries’ imports and exports of both goods and services. Our work can be
understood as embedding their analysis in a fully structural model which allows for
theory-consistent variance decompositions and counterfactuals.
The present paper belongs to a large and growing strand of research, reaching back
to Eaton and Kortum (2002), which uses calibrated quantitative models of interna-
tional trade to analyse the relationship between countries’ sector-level productivities,
bilateral trade costs and real incomes. Several papers in this literature − including
Dekle et al. (2007, 2008), Eaton et al. (2016a), and Cuñat and Zymek (2018) −
explore the impact of (changes in) aggregate trade imbalances on countries’ incomes.
Some analyse the impact of (changes in) trade costs on aggregate trade imbalances
− following on from the classic paper by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).5 Yet to the
best of our knowledge, none explore the determinants of bilateral trade balances; and
few investigate the prevalence and macroeconomic implications of asymmetric trade
barriers.
A notable exception is Waugh (2010), who shows that asymmetric trade barriers
between rich and poor countries can help better reconcile quantitative trade models
with countries’ observed aggregate import shares. He demonstrates that removing
them would potentially reduce international income differences significantly. Our
findings are complementary with Waugh’s analysis (2010), which abstracts from trade
imbalances, insofar as they illustrate that trade-wedge asymmetries are also required
to account for a portion of countries’ bilateral trade surpluses and deficits. Moreover,
we find that such asymmetries may not only shape trade between rich and poor
countries, but also sector-level trade patterns between developed economies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the the-
oretical model that serves as the basis for our analysis. Section 3 describes our
data sources and calibration strategy. Section 4 reports the results of our account-
ing decomposition of bilateral imbalances. Section 5 carries out our counterfactual
experiments. Section 6 offers a brief summary and concluding remarks.
4Anderson (1979), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) were the first to show that model-
consistent gravity equations feature so-called “multilateral resistance terms” − reflecting differences
in price levels faced by different countries −, and that their omission may significantly alter the
findings derived from applying the gravity equation to empirical data.
5See Reyes-Heroles (2016), Eaton et al. (2016b) and Ravikumar et al. (2019) for recent quantit-
ative assessments of changes in trade barriers on countries’ aggregate trade balances.
5
2 Model
2.1 Model Setup
2.1.1 Overview
The theoretical foundation of our analysis is a dynamic many-country, many-sector
model of international trade. In the model, forward-looking agents make consump-
tion and savings decisions. International asset trade is permitted, and differences
in technology and the rate of time preference across countries give rise to aggregate
trade surpluses and deficits. Final consumption and investment require tradable in-
puts from many sectors. Countries differ in their reliance on, and productivity in,
these sectors. In addition, sectoral inputs are differentiated by their country of origin.
This creates a motive for international trade between and within sectors.
As we will show below, aggregating the sectoral trade flows in this model delivers a
compact and intuitive expression for bilateral imbalances. This expression illustrates
the role of the three drivers of such imbalances discussed in the Introduction: aggreg-
ate trade surpluses and deficits, cross-country differences in production and spending
patterns, and asymmetric trade barriers.
We make two crucial assumptions which require some discussion. The first is
that agents’ lifespans are not infinite, as in the Ramsey model, but may end each
period with a constant probability, as in Blanchard (1985). Agents whose life ends
are replaced by a cohort of newly-borns. The appearance of new cohorts each period
breaks the tight link between the growth rate of aggregate consumption and agents’
individual Euler equations which characterises the Ramsey model. As a result, our
model permits a non-degenerate distribution of assets in steady state, even in the
presence of differences in savings preferences across countries. This, in turn, implies
that countries’ overall trade need not be balanced in the long run.6
The second assumption is that trade within sectors can be characterised by a
standard structural gravity equation as in, for example, Anderson (1979) and Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003). We obtain this by imposing that countries trade in
country-specific sectoral varieties, as in Armington (1969). However, the particular
microfoundation of the gravity equation is not crucial for our purposes: we could
obtain the same gravity equation by letting trade patterns at the sectoral level arise
from variants of the Krugman, Melitz and Eaton-Kortum models, or even combina-
tions thereof.7
6In a similar spirit, Matsuyama (1987) uses an open-economy version of the Blanchard model in
order to analyse the current-account dynamics of a small open economy whose rate of time preference
differs from the world interest rate.
7See Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014).
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2.1.2 Preferences and Endowments
There are many countries, denoted by n = 1, ..., N . Time lasts forever, and there is
no aggregate uncertainty. However, individual agents face a constant probability of
death, ξ, each period. There is a unit mass of agents in each country, and each period
an exogenous mass ξ of agents is born in n, so that net population growth is zero in all
countries. Agents in country n discount the future at rate ρn and are endowed with
Hnt units of human capital, which they supply inelastically in domestic labour markets
at wage wnt. Hnt grows exogenously at gross rate γ for all countries: Hnt+1 = γHnt.
Agents are born without wealth, but can accumulate it through savings. Actuarily fair
life insurance is available: agents in n choose to pay their wealth to the life insurance
company if they die, and in return have 1 + ξ/ (1− ξ) = 1/ (1− ξ) times their wealth
if they live. There is no bequest motive, and negative bequests are prohibited.
Agents’ period utility is logarithmic in final consumption each period, and we
denote by Cnt (t′) the final consumption in period t of an agent in country n who was
born in period t′. The optimal-savings problem of an agent born in period t′ can be
expressed as
max
{Cnt(t′)}∞t=t′
∞∑
t=t′
(
1− ξ
1 + ρn
)t−t′
lnCnt (t
′) (1)
subject to
PntCnt (t
′) + Ant+1 (t′) = wntHnt +
Rt
1− ξAnt (t
′) (2)
Ant′ (t
′) = 0, (3)
where Pnt denotes the price of final consumption in country n and period t; Rt is the
return to wealth, which is equal across countries (as we discuss below); and Ant (t′)
is the wealth that a cohort-t′ member has at the beginning of period t, before the
uncertainty about her death has been resolved.8 We describe the solution to this
problem in Appendix A.1. Aggregate final consumption in country n is a weighted
average of the final consumption of cohorts alive in n in period t:
Cnt =
t∑
t′=−∞
ξ (1− ξ)t−t′ Cnt (t′) . (4)
2.1.3 Technologies
In each country n firms assemble a non-traded final good by using inputs from many
sectors, s = 1, ..., S:
Xnt =
∏
s=1
(
Xsnt
σsn
)σsn
, (5)
8After this uncertainty is resolved, the wealth of a surviving cohort-t′ member in period t is
Ant (t
′) / (1− ξ) .
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where σsn ∈ (0, 1);
∑
s σsn = 1; Xnt is the output of the final good; and Xsnt is the
quantity of sector-s inputs used. The sector-s input is also non-tradable, but firms
assemble it from tradable, country-specific varieties:
Xsnt =
(
N∑
n′=1
ω
1
1+θs
sn′n x
θs
1+θs
sn′nt
) 1+θs
θs
, (6)
where θs ≥ 0; ωsnn ≥ 0; and xsn′nt represents the use of the country-n′ variety in the
production of the sector-s input by country n. The country-n variety in sector s is
produced with the Cobb-Douglas technology
Qsnt = Zsn
(
KαnsntH
1−αn
snt
1− µsn
)1−µsn (
Jsnt
µsn
)µsn
, (7)
where αn, µsn ∈ (0, 1). Ksnt and Hsnt respectively represent the capital and efficiency
units of labour used; Jsnt denotes the use of the country-n final good as interme-
diate input in s; and shifter Zsn describes the country-sector-specific efficiency of
production.
The final good in country n can be used to provide one unit of final consumption,
one unit of intermediate input for one of the country-sector-specific varieties, Jsnt, or
1/ηn > 0 units of investment, Int: Xnt = Cnt+ηnInt+
∑
s Jsnt. The parameter ηn thus
captures (inversely) the investment efficiency of country n. Investment in country n
adds to the country’s capital stock according to:
Knt+1 = Int + (1− δ)Knt, (8)
where δ ∈ (0, 1); Knt is the capital stock of n in period t.
2.1.4 Market Structure
Goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive. International trade is subject
to iceberg transport costs: dsn′n ≥ 1 units of the country-n′, sector-s variety must
be shipped for one unit to arrive in country n. Production factors can move freely
between activities within countries, but cannot move across borders.
Agents in all countries can trade in a one-period international riskless bond (which
is in zero net supply) in a competitive global bond market. One unit of bond holdings
at the end of period t pays a nominal return of Rt. The wealth that a cohort-t′ member
has at the beginning of period t is Ant (t′) ≡ Knt (t′) +Bnt (t′).
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2.2 Steady State
2.2.1 Definition of the Steady State
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we will focus exclusively on steady states of
the model described in Section 2.1. For a given set of parameters, the model has a
unique steady state in which all aggregate variables − Cnt, Int, Knt, Bnt and Ynt −
grow at the constant rate γ. Consequently all prices are constant, as are the ratios
Cnt/Hnt ≡ cn, Int/Hnt ≡ in, Knt/Hnt ≡ kn, Bnt/Hnt ≡ bn and Ynt/Hnt ≡ yn.
The assumption that the world economy is in steady state may seem rather strong.
However, as we will show below, it is not crucial for the first part of our analysis in
Section 4, in which we provide an account of the sources of the observed variation
in bilateral trade imbalances across country pairs. It is only crucial for the second
part in Section 5, in which we explore changes in prices, capital stocks and aggregate
trade surpluses and deficits in response to counterfactual changes in trade barriers.
We are content to rely on this assumption in Section 5 for two reasons. First, it
allows us to perform illustrative counterfactuals about the long-run impact of changes
in trade barriers which are in the spirit of typical static trade counterfactuals − but do
not require us to assume that capital stocks and trade balances are exogenously given
(as in, for example, Deckle et al., 2007; 2008). Second, the calibrated steady state
of our model turns out to be consistent with two widely acknowledged observations
about aggregate trade balances: i) high-savings countries are more likely to run trade
surpluses; and ii) overall trade surpluses and deficits are fairly persistent over time.
2.2.2 Description of the Steady State
Steady-state prices are given by
PCn = P
J
n =
P In
ηn
=
S∏
s=1
[
N∑
n′=1
(τsn′npsn′)
−θs
]−σsn
θs
≡ Pn, (9)
where PCnt, P Int and P Int respectively denote the final-consumption price, the interme-
diates price, and the investment price; and
psn =
1
Zsn
f 1−µsnn P
µsn
n , fn ≡
(
rn
αn
)αn ( wn
1− αn
)1−αn
(10)
where fn is the factor cost of country n, and τsn′n ≡ ω−1/θssn′n dsn′n. We will refer to τsn′n
as the sector-s “trade wedge” which applies to imports of country n from n′. As the
model illustrates, we should not think of this wedge as representing trade costs only:
τsn′n encompasses a trade-cost component, dsn′n, as well as a component which derives
from countries’ preferences/technologies, ωsn′n. Our calibration below will not allow
9
us to identify these components separately. Instead, we will only obtain a measure
of the relative magnitude of the overall wedge, τsn′n. We can think of this wedge as
the ad-valorem tax equivalent of all factors which may impede sectoral trade between
country pairs.
Equalisation of the returns to physical capital and the riskless bond yields
R =
αn
ηn
fn
Pn
kαn−1n + 1− δ. (11)
In Appendix A.1 we show that the steady-state ratio of aggregate net exports to GDP
of country n is
NXnt
fnkαnn Hnt
= 1−
αn
(
1− 1−δ
γ
)
R
γ
− 1−δ
γ
− ξ (ρn + ξ)
R
γ
(1− αn)[
1 + ρn − Rγ (1− ξ)
] [
R
γ
− (1− ξ)
] . (12)
This ratio depends negatively on the capital share of country n (αn). A country with
a large capital share will have a higher share of investment expenditure and a lower
share of next exports in GDP, everything else constant. If γ > R, it also depends
negatively on the discount rate of country n (ρn). A country with a high discount
rate will have negative holdings of the international bond; if γ > R, the value of
new international liabilities it incurs each period outstrips the interest payments it
must make on past liabilities in steady state. As a result, its steady-state expenditure
exceeds its steady-state GDP, causing a trade deficit. Conversely, a country with a
low discount rate will run a trade surplus in steady state.9
Applying Shephard’s Lemma in equation (9) yields the value of sector-s imports
by country n from n′:
Msn′nt =
(τsn′npsn′)
−θs∑N
n′′=1 (τsn′′npsn′′)
−θs σsn
(
S∑
s=1
psnQsnt −NXnt
)
. (13)
Market clearing implies
psnQsnt =
N∑
n′=1
Msnn′t; fnk
αn
n Hnt =
S∑
s=1
(1− µsn) psnQsnt;
N∑
n=1
NXnt = 0. (14)
For given model parameters, there is a unique (up to a normalisation) vector of
equilibrium factor costs, {fn}n, which satisfies pricing conditions (9) and (10) and
market-clearing conditions (13) and (14).
9In our calibration below, γ > R turns out to be the relevant case. If γ < R, the interest
payments an impatient country makes in steady state outstrip its new international liabilities. In
this case, the country’s steady-state GDP exceeds expenditure, causing a trade surplus. Conversely,
a patient countries will run a trade deficit in steady state.
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Finally, we can express the steady-state real GDP per effective worker of country
n as
Ynt
Hnt
≡ fn
Pn
kαnn = k
αn
n ×
S∏
s=1
(
Zsn
τsnn
) σsn
1−∑s σsnµsn ×
S∏
s=1
(
Msnnt∑N
n′=1Msn′nt
)− 1
θs
σsn
1−∑s σsnµsn
.
(15)
Note that real GDP is the product of three terms, respectively: the per-effective
worker capital stock (which is endogenous); a weighted geometric average of sectoral
productivities relative to internal trade barriers (which we will take as exogenous);
and a weighted geometric average of ACR terms which capture the contribution of
trade to income (and which are endogenous).10
2.3 Bilateral Trade Imbalances
2.3.1 A Gravity Representation of Bilateral Trade Balances
For our analysis of the drivers of bilateral trade balances, it is convenient to write the
expression for the trade balance between countries n and n′ in “gravity form”. From
equation (13),
Mn′nt −Mnn′t = pn
′Qn′t (pnQnt −NXnt)∑
n pnQnt
S∑
s=1
(
τsn′n
Osn′Psn
)−θs
qsn′σsn+
−pnQnt (pn′Qn′t −NXn′t)∑
n pnQnt
∑
s
(
τsnn′
OsnPsn′
)−θs
qsnσsn′ , (16)
where Mn′n ≡
∑
sMsn′n is the total value of imports by country n from n
′; pnQnt ≡∑
s psnQsnt is the total value of country-n total output; qsn ≡ psnQsnt/ (pnQnt) is the
share of country-n output in sector s; and
Osn′ ≡
[∑
n
(
τsn′n
Psn
)−θs
σsn
pnQnt −NXnt∑
n pnQnt
]− 1
θs
(17)
is the so-called “outward multilateral resistance term” of country n′ in s. Corres-
pondingly, Psn is sometimes referred to as the “inward multilateral resistance term”
of country n in s, and it can be re-written as:
Psn =
[∑
n′
(
τsn′n
Osn′
)−θs
qsn′
pn′Qn′∑
n pnQn
]− 1
θs
. (18)
Equations (16)-(18) illustrate how bilateral trade imbalances are shaped by aggreg-
ate trade surpluses and deficits, cross-country differences in production and spending
10See Arkolakis et al. (2012), Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) and Ossa (2015).
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patterns, and asymmetric trade barriers. Everything else constant, the trade deficit
of country n with n′ will be larger,...
1. ...the larger the aggregate trade deficit of n; and the larger the aggregate trade
surplus of n′.
2. ...the larger the share of spending by n in sectors which account for a large
share of production in n′; and the smaller the share of spending by n′ in sectors
which account for a large share of production in n.
3. ...the smaller the trade wedges for shipping from n′ to n relative to all trading
opportunities of country n; and the larger the trade wedges for shipping from
n to n′ relative to all trading opportunities of country n′.11
Moreover, the equations show that if all trade were balanced in the aggregate (NXnt =
0 for all n), if production and spending shares were the same across countries (qsn =
σsn = qs = σs for all n), and if trade wedges were symmetric (τsn′n = τsnn′ for all n
and n′), all trade would be balanced bilaterally. This is because Psn = Osn for all n
in this case.
2.3.2 Linear Approximation
In Appendix A.2 we show that equation (16) can be linearly approximated by means
of a first-order Taylor expansion as:
Mn′nt −Mnn′t
M
1
2
nntM
1
2
n′n′t
' Ω
∑
s
(
Msn′ntMsnn′t
Mn′ntMnn′t
) 1
2
{
ln
(
1−NXnt/pnQnt
1−NXn′/pn′Qn′t
)
+ (19)
+ ln
(
qsn′σsn
qsnσsn′
)
− θs ln
(
τsn′n
τsnn′
)
− θs ln
(
OsnPsn′
Osn′Psn
)}
,
where Ω > 0 is an arbitrary constant.
The expression in (19) tells us that − to a first-order approximation − we can
decompose the bilateral trade balance between countries n and n′ into four addit-
ive terms: one representing differences in the countries’ overall trade surpluses; one
representing differences in the countries production and spending patterns; one rep-
resenting bilateral asymmetries in trade wedges; and one representing differences in
the countries ratios of outward to inward multilateral resistance terms (MRTs here-
after). It follows from the discussion in Section 2.3.1 that deviations from zero of
the last term must be the result of deviations from zero across the other three terms
for countries n and n′ with at least some of their trading partners. Therefore, we
11Equation (16) corresponds to equation (6) in Davis and Weinstein (2002) − up to the terms in
round brackets containing the sectoral trade wedges and multilateral resistance terms. In taking this
equation to the data, Davis and Weinstein (2002) control for trade barriers by means of standard
“gravity” proxies for trade costs, but they omit theory-consistent multilateral resistances.
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can loosely think of the final term as arising from the “interaction” of overall trade
positions, differences in production and spending patterns and asymmetric wedges
across the trade partners of n and n′.
In the next section, we will calibrate the steady state of our model to match
observed bilateral trade flows, aggregate trade surpluses and sectoral production and
spending patterns perfectly. In Section 4, we will then perform a decomposition of the
variance of bilateral imbalances using equation (19). Note that this decomposition
does not rely on the assumption that the world economy is in steady state. It can be
performed for a given observed trade flows, aggregate surpluses and sectoral shares
irrespective of the “fundamentals” of the world economy which give rise to them. The
only crucial assumption to arrive at (19) is that, within periods, sectoral trade flows
can be modelled using the gravity-consistent expression in (13).
3 Data and Calibration
3.1 Data
Our analysis relies on data from two main sources: the Penn World Tables (PWT 9.0;
Feenstra et al., 2015), and the World Input Output Database (WIOD 2016 release;
Timmer et al., 2015). For all data taken from these sources, we calculate a simple
five-year average of the reported values in our period of interest. We do this so as
to average out short-run fluctuations in the values of trade balances, incomes and
expenditure shares. Our baseline analysis uses data for the five most recent years
available, 2010-14.
The 2016 release of WIOD consists of annual global input-output tables covering
43 countries and the “rest of the world”, with spending broken down into 56 sectors at
the 2-digit level of ISIC (Rev. 4). Out of the 43 countries, three have populations of
less than 1 million (Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta). We merge these with the “rest of
the world” totals to focus on larger and more diversified economies. We also aggregate
sectors to obtain 16 broad manufacturing sectors and 15 service sectors. We do this
in order to make the data consistent with available information on sectoral trade
elasticities (see below). The resulting global input-output table covers 40 countries
and the “rest of the world”, with spending broken down into 31 sectors. Tables A1-A3
in the Appendix give an overview of our aggregation of regions and sectors relative
to the original WIOD data. To construct “rest of the world” data from the PWT, we
aggregate factor endowments, incomes and income shares for all countries included
in PWT but not among the 40 individual countries covered in our final world input-
output table.
[Insert Table 1 here]
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From the WIOD data, we obtain the value of country-n spending on country-n′
output in sector s, {Msn′nt}s,n′,n.12 Summing across sectors, yields (41 × 40/2 =)
820 distinct bilateral trade balances. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the
absolute value of these, expressed relative to the geometric average of the countries’
expenditures on their own goods: |Mn′nt −Mnn′t| /
(
M
1/2
nntM
1/2
n′n′t
)
. The median is
equal to .46, and there is significant variation: the smallest imbalance is (nearly) 0,
while the largest ratio is 5.01.
3.2 Calibration
3.2.1 Production, Population and Preference Parameters
Some model parameters can be taken directly from PWT and WIOD data. We
calculate capital shares, {αn}n, as 1 minus a country’s labour share reported in PWT
9.0. The share of total country-n spending on sector-s, {σsn}s,n, and the share of
country-n spending on intermediates in sector s, {µsn}s,n, are computed based on the
information contained in WIOD.
To obtain investment efficiencies, {ηn}n, we use equation (11) to match the per-
effective-worker capital stocks, {kn}n, in PWT 9.0 for a given world interest rate. The
target world interest rate in our baseline calibration is R = 1.030 based on estimates
by King and Low (2014) of the real world interest rate during the 1985-2014 period.
Our sectoral trade elasticities, {θs}, are taken from Caliendo and Parro (2015) and
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014). The value of these elasticities is reported in
Table A3. The capital depreciation rate is calibrated to be δ = .06.
We set the steady state growth rate to γ = 1.044 to match the average annual
growth rate of world GDP during the 1985-2014 period from PWT 9.0. Note that
this implies γ > R. The probability of death for an individual agent is put at ξ = .13,
yielding an expected lifespan of 60 years for an agent in our model.
Finally, we use the discount rates, {ρn}n, to match observed trade balances. The
value of the trade balance as a share of country-nGDP, {NXnt/ (fnkαnn Hnt)}n, is taken
from WIOD, which provides consistent values of countries’ aggregate trade surpluses.
The resulting correlation between discount rates and aggregate trade balances is -.75:
more impatient countries tend to have trade deficits, while patient countries tend to
have surpluses.
12For our country sample, and our chosen level of sectoral aggregation, zero-valued flows are very
uncommon. Out of a total of (31 × 41 × 41 =) 52,111 sector-country-pair flows, less than 2% are
zero-valued.
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3.2.2 Productivity and Trade-Cost Parameters
The WIOD data gives us SN (N − 1) sectoral spending shares. To match these, our
model allows us to choose SN (N − 1) relative trade wedges, and S (N − 1) relative
sectoral productivities. This leaves us with S (N − 1) degrees of freedom in calibrating
productivity and trade-cost parameters. We follow Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
exploit these degrees of freedom to attribute to trade wedges only the residual portion
of trade shares which cannot be attributed to country-sector variation.13
Specifically, we use equation (13) to derive:
Msn′n
M
1
2
snnM
1
2
sn′n′
=
[
qsn′σsn (1− nxn)
qsnσsn′ (1− nxn′)
(
Osn
Osn′
Psn′
Psn
)−θs] 12 ( τsn′n
τ
1
2
snnτ
1
2
sn′n′
)−θs
. (20)
We then estimate the gravity equation
Msn′n
M
1
2
snnM
1
2
sn′n′
= exp {∆sn′ −∆sn + εsn′n} , (21)
where ∆sn is a sector-country fixed effect, and εsn′n is an error term. Finally, we
impose (
τsn′n
τ
1
2
snnτ
1
2
sn′n′
)−θs
= exp {εˆsn′n} ∀ n′, n, (22)
and we choose {Zsn/ZsUSA}s,n 6=USA so as to match ∆sn′ − ∆sn. The additional re-
striction in (22) amounts to minimising the role played by trade wedges in explaining
sectoral trade patterns.
[Insert Table 2 here]
This leaves us with S absolute sectoral productivities for our reference country,
the U.S., and SN “internal” trade wedges, {τsnn}s,n. We would like our model to
match the per-effective-worker GDPs of our sample countries which, from equation
(15), imposes a further N restrictions on these S (N + 1) parameters. Beyond these,
however, there is no need to pin down parameters further as all productivities and
internal trade wedges will remain constant throughout our analysis, and their absolute
values have no bearing on any of the results presented below. Table 2 presents an
overview of our model calibration.
13See Eaton and Kortum (2002), Section 5.1, pp. 1759-1762.
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4 Bilateral Balance Accounting
4.1 Variance Decomposition
We begin by decomposing the variation in bilateral imbalances across country pairs
using equation (19). Note that the calibration of productivities and trade wedges
described in Section 3.2.2 implies that
−θs ln
(
τsn′n
τsnn′
)
= εˆsn′n − εˆsnn′
−θs ln
(
OsnPsn′
Osn′Psn
)
= 2
(
∆ˆsn′ − ∆ˆsn
) qsnσsn′ (1−NXn′/pn′Qn′t)
qsn′σsn (1−NXnt/pnQnt) .
Under the parameter restrictions described in Section 3.2.2, we thus obtain the third
and fourth terms of expression (19) directly from the country-sector dummies es-
timated using (21). Moreover, we do not need to take a stance on sectoral trade
elasticities to proceed with the decomposition.
Figure 3 plots the approximated country-pair trade imbalances against their data
counterparts. As the figure shows, the correlation between the two is high: theR2 with
respect to the 45-degree line is .90, and there are only a handful significant outliers.
This strongly suggests that we can meaningfully decompose bilateral imbalances for
the large majority of country pairs using the approximation in equation (19).
[Insert Figure 3 here]
In Figure 4, we plot each of the four terms in (19) against the respective (approx-
imated) country-pair trade imbalance, expressed relative to the geometric average of
the two countries’ expenditures on their own goods. In each panel, the red line rep-
resents the line of best fit. The slope of this line, also shown in red, corresponds to
the share of the variation in trade imbalances which can be attributed to each term.14
By construction, the four slope coefficients add up to 1.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
As can be seen from Figure 4, variation in countries’ aggregate trade balances
accounts for the smallest share of the variation in bilateral trade balances − a mere
2%. Differences in production and spending patterns (“triangular trade”) account for
12% of the variation, and asymmetric trade wedges account for 38%. The remaining
47% are due to variation in the ratio of inward to outward MRTs. As discussed in
Section 2.3.2, we can think of this last term as reflecting the result of interactions
between the first three.
14To see this, note that the slope of a univariate linear regression of xi on y is Cov (xi, y) /V ar (y);
and that for y ≡∑i xi, we can write V ar (y) = ∑i Cov (xi, y).
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There are three main takeaways from our variance decomposition. First, overall
trade surpluses and deficits explain only a vanishingly small portion of the variation
in bilateral trade balances across country pairs. This is striking because macroeco-
nomic imbalances are frequently cited as a key driver of bilateral imbalances in the
public discourse. Our results suggest that this emphasis may be misplaced. Second,
differences in the gap between the outward and inward MRT across countries are
an important factor behind the variation in bilateral trade balances. This finding
is noteworthy because the original analysis of bilateral trade balances by Davis and
Weinstein (2002), which pre-dated the structural gravity “revolution”, did not account
for the role of MRTs at all.
Third and finally, we re-cover the “mystery” uncovered by Davis and Weinstein
(2002) in a different guise: large asymmetries in trade wedges are required to explain
why some country pairs have bigger imbalances than others. Since we calibrate these
wedges as a gravity residual, we can think of the resulting trade-wedge asymmetries
as reflecting the portion of bilateral imbalances we cannot account for through ob-
servables (such as aggregate trade balances or production and spending shares). This
portion amounts to 38%. Indeed, this number represents a likely understatement
since equations (17) and (18) tell us that asymmetries in trade wedges also contrib-
ute to (variation in) the gap of between outward and inward MRTs. We return to
this point in Section 5.
In Appendix A.3, we repeat our variance decomposition for data from the 1995-
1999 period, the earliest for which WIOD data is available. The quantitative results
for this earlier period are virtually the same as those described above. We also show
that there is a strong correlation between 2010-2014 bilateral trade balances and their
1995-99 counterparts, even 15 years on.
4.2 Trade-Wedge Asymmetries
Having shown that trade-wedge asymmetries are required to account for a large share
of the variation in bilateral trade imbalances, we now investigate their properties
further. Define the log difference between “average” trade wedges from country n′ to
n and “average” wedges from country n to n′ as
ln τn′n − ln τnn′ ≡
∑
s
(
Msn′nMsnn′
Mn′nMnn′
) 1
2 θs
θ
(ln τsn′n − ln τsnn′) =
=
∑
s
(
Msn′nMsnn′
Mn′nMnn′
) 1
2 εˆsnn′ − εˆsn′n
θ
. (23)
where θ is the aggregate trade elasticity.
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The larger is ln τn′n− ln τnn′ , the more difficult it is to sell goods and services from
n′ in n relative to selling goods and services from n in n′.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the absolute value of ln τn′n− ln τnn′ across
our 820 distinct country pairs, imposing θ = 4. We choose θ = 4 throughout, in keep-
ing with Simonovska and Waugh’s (2014) estimate of the aggregate trade elasticity,
and because it is close to the median of our sectoral trade elasticities in Table A3
(which is 5). The table highlights that sizeable trade-wedge asymmetries are required
for the model to fit sectoral trade flows perfectly. For the median country pair, the av-
erage import wedge in one direction is roughly 6% higher than in the other direction.
For 10% of country pairs, this gap is larger than 50%.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
By way of illustration, Figure 5 displays the log difference between the U.S. aver-
age import wedge from each of its trading partners and the corresponding partner’s
average import wedge from the U.S. As can be seen from the figure, the U.S. has
lower import wedges for roughly half its trade partners relative to the wedges which
apply to U.S. imports in the partner country. In some cases, these differences are
not small: the calibration implies that import wedges from the U.S. to Mexico are
almost 18% larger than import wedges from Mexico to the U.S. However, not every
large US bilateral deficit is associated with low U.S. import wedges relative to the
respective trade partner’s. For example, the U.S. has its largest bilateral trade deficit
with China. Yet Chinese imports into the U.S. actually face a 3% higher trade wedge
than U.S. imports into China.
The pattern in Figure 5 is fairly typical across countries. Most countries in our
sample have a roughly even number of trade relationships in which their average
import wedge is lower than the partner’s wedge in the other direction, and of those in
which it is higher. The country with the largest number of negative bilateral trade-
wedge gaps (China) has 26, the country with the smallest number (Greece) has 11.
The standard deviation of bilateral trade-wedge gaps across countries ranges from .06
to .18.
[Insert Table 4 here]
In order to ascertain whether the asymmetries in trade wedges appear to be sys-
tematically related to observable characteristics of country pairs, we regress them on
a range of standard gravity variables for all pairs (except the 40 pairs involving the
rest of the world). The results are displayed in Table 4. Columns 1-3 successively
introduce some commonly used variables in the empirical analysis of bilateral trade
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flows: the log of population-weighted distance between countries n′ and n (see Head
and Mayer, 2014); a “contiguous” dummy which takes value 1 if n′ and n share a com-
mon border, 0 otherwise; a “colonial” dummy which takes value 1 if n′ and n share a
colonial history, 0 otherwise; a “common currency” dummy which takes value 1 if n′
and n share a currency, 0 otherwise; an FTA dummy which takes value 1 if n′ and
n are parties to a free-trade agreement, 0 otherwise; and an EU dummy which takes
value 1 if n′ and n are both EU members, 0 otherwise. In addition, the specification
in column 4 employs a full set of country fixed effects.
The trade-wedge asymmetries implied by our calibration do not correlate strongly
with any of these gravity variables: the estimated coefficients are small and not ro-
bustly statistically significant. While the conditional correlations in Table 4 cannot
provide conclusive proof either way, the patterns dot not lend much support to the
notion that the trade-wedge asymmetries implied by our model calibration are sys-
tematically related to geography, trade agreements or the institutional environment
of countries’ trade relationships.
5 Counterfactuals
5.1 Trade-Cost Counterfactuals in the Model
The variance decomposition in Section 4 allows us to make an informative first assess-
ment of the relative importance of aggregate trade balances, differences in sectoral
spending and production shares and trade-wedge asymmetries in accounting for ob-
served differences in bilateral trade balances. However, a static decomposition of this
type has two shortcomings.
First, as shown in Section 4.1, a large part of the variation is attributed to vari-
ation in the ratio of inward to outward MRTs across countries − which reflects the
interaction of the three main channels. If, for example, all trade wedges were sym-
metric across countries, we know that the ratio of the inward to outward MRTs would
tend to be closer to 1 for all countries. This would diminish the importance of the
fourth term in expression (19).
Second, changes in the world economy which significantly affect consumption and
saving, sectoral spending and production, and trade wedges would be expected to
have general equilibrium effects − not only on prices, but also on the magnitude
and distribution of per-effective-worker capital stocks and overall trade surpluses and
deficits. For example, a change in trade costs which makes all trade wedges bilaterally
symmetric may raise the marginal product of capital in some countries relative to
others. The result would be a change in the distribution of capital across countries, in
the world interest rate, and in the magnitude of steady-state aggregate trade balances.
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These shortcomings can only be addressed through a fully-fledged counterfactual.
In the following, we will use the model developed in Section 2 to provide two such
counterfactuals with respect to changes in trade barriers. The underlying thought
experiment is: what would bilateral trade balances look like in a world in which trade
policy has made trade wedges bilaterally (more) symmetric? We focus on trade-wedge
asymmetries because Section 4 has shown them to be the most important individual
driver of differences in bilateral trade balances across countries. The primary motiva-
tion for our counterfactuals is to give a more complete quantitative assessment of their
importance, addressing the two shortcomings of the static decomposition head-on. A
secondary motivation is to illustrate the impact − and limits − of a hypothetical
trade policy which aims to reduce bilateral imbalances.
The trade-wedge parameters defined in Section {τsn′n}s,n′,n, capture the ad-valorem
tax equivalent of all impediments to trade between two countries in a given sector.
Both our counterfactuals will consider increases in the iceberg component of these
wedges. Specifically, we will impose
dnewsn′n = dsn′n ×max
{
τsnn′
τsn′n
, 1
}
∀ s (24)
and for at least some n′ and n: in each sector s, the iceberg import cost of the country
with the lower import wedge rises to equalise it with the trade partner’s higher wedge.
One way to think of this experiment is as a revenue-free trade policy which aims to
equalise trade wedges in order to create bilaterally “fair” trading conditions. In Section
5.2, we impose this change for all n′ and n. In Section 5.3, we impose it only for the
U.S. and China.
5.2 Global Trade-Wedge Symmetry
In the first counterfactual, we let the lower import wedge rise to the level of the higher
import wedge in each sector and for each country pair. Figure 6 plots the remaining
bilateral trade balances in the counterfactual new steady state of the world economy
against the original (actual) balances. In the counterfactual steady state, there is a
lot less variation in bilateral imbalances: the slope of the line of best fit between the
new and the original bilateral imbalances is only .42. In line with the discussion in
Section 4.1, it suggests that asymmetric trade wedges account (approximately) for
60% of the variation in bilateral imbalances, once their MRT and general-equilibrium
effects are taken into account.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Most of the indirect effects of imposing symmetric wedges on bilateral trade bal-
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ances are the result of changes in the MRTs. Analogously with (23), we define
ln
(
On
Pn
)
≡
∑
n′
∑
s
(
Msn′nMsnn′
Mn′nMnn′
) 1
2 θs
θ
[
ln
(
Osn
Psn
)
− ln
(
Osn′
Psn′
)]
(25)
as the average gap of the outward to inward MRT in country n, relative to all its trade
partners. Figure 7 shows values of this statistic for all countries in our data in the
original and counterfactual steady state (light blue and navy bars, respectively). The
figure illustrates a dramatic decline in the variance of the average outward-inward-
MRT gap across countries, from .012 to .004. Unsurprisingly, some of the largest
changes are experienced by smaller countries which are more strongly affected by
changes in their external trade wedges.
[Insert Figure 7 here]
Meanwhile, the rise in trade barriers has almost no impact on overall trade deficits
and surpluses. Figure 8 presents countries’ overall trade deficits, as a percentage of
GDP, in the original and new steady state (light blue and navy bars, respectively).
The changes are virtually imperceptible. This is because the new set of trade barriers
leave the world interest rate almost unchanged. The higher trade barriers increase
the investment price index in all countries, which reduces the global demand for
capital. It also reduces the world economy’s efficiency in adding to capital stocks,
which reduces the global supply of capital. The net effect of these countervailing
forces on the world interest rate is nearly zero, and without changes in the world
interest rate − via equation (12) −there are no changes in aggregate trade balances.
[Insert Figure 8 here]
Absent asymmetries in trade wedges, bilateral imbalances in the new steady state
are entirely the result of aggregate trade balances, and differences in production and
spending patterns. In Figure 9, we perform the variance decomposition described in
Section 4.1 using the new data generated by our counterfactual steady state. By con-
struction, the contribution of trade-wedge asymmetries to the variation in bilateral
imbalances in now zero. Moreover, the individual contribution of overall trade sur-
pluses and deficits remains small, at just over 4%. Therefore, most of the remaining
variation in the MRT term − and, hence, most of the remaining variation in bilateral
imbalances − must be due to “triangular trade”. This observation gives rise to one
of the headline findings of our analysis: more than half of the variation in bilateral
imbalances must be attributed to asymmetric trade wedges, while overall trade sur-
pluses and deficits account for a negligible share; the rest is due to differences in the
production and spending patterns of countries.
[Insert Figure 9 here]
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By raising trade barriers, our counterfactual reduces the real GDP of all countries.
Figure 10 gives an overview of the declines in real GDP and aggregate consumption
per effective worker in the new steady state relative to the status quo. Aggregate con-
sumption in all countries is proportional to real GDP, with a factor of proportionality
that depends only on parameters and the world interest rate:
cn =
γξ (ρn + ξ)R (1− αn)
[γ (1 + ρn)−R (1− ξ)] [R− γ (1− ξ)]yn. (26)
Since the world interest rate changes little between the original and the new steady
state, the declines in consumption closely track the declines in countries’ GDPs. As
would be expected, smaller countries generally see larger declines in real consumption
and GDP. However, even for larger countries, the bilateral equalisation of trade wedges
has substantive effects: for Japan and the U.S. real GDP falls by 2.6% and 2.7%,
respectively; for Germany and China, by 4.8% and 5.2%, respectively.
[Insert Figure 10 here]
So as to return to our motivating example, Figure 11 contrasts U.S. bilateral net
exports (as a percentage of U.S. GDP) in the counterfactual steady state with their
contemporary counterparts. Trade-wedge symmetry causes some of large bilateral
deficits to shrink − notably, the U.S. deficit with China, Mexico and Canada. How-
ever, it also causes some deficits to rise − notably those with Japan, Germany and
Korea − and some surpluses to turn into deficits − notably, those with Ireland, the
Netherlands and France. This “reshuﬄing” of imbalances is easy to explain: since
we know from Figure 8 that the overall U.S. trade deficit is barely affected by the
changes in trade barriers, any reduction in a bilateral deficit must be offset by an
increased deficit or reduced surplus with another trade partner.
[Insert Figure 11 here]
Figure 11 also highlights the importance of the changes in MRTs which result
from equalising trade wedges bilaterally. For example, the figure shows that the U.S.
deficit with China declines by a quarter, despite the fact that Figure 5 showed that
U.S. import wedges from China were actually higher in the original steady state than
Chinese wedges from the U.S. Without MRT changes, we would have expected the
U.S. deficit with China to grow, not shrink. However, as can be seen from Figure 7,
China has a relatively high outward MRT in the baseline steady state: the calibration
identifies China as a country with generally relatively good exporting opportunities
relative to its importing opportunities. This makes China more prone to being a net
exporter in bilateral trade relationships. From Figure 7, our trade-cost counterfactual
rebalances exporting and importing opportunities for China towards importing − and
this cause’s China’s surplus with the U.S. (and the U.S. deficit with China) to shrink.
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5.3 U.S.-China Trade Wedge Symmetry
In the second counterfactual, we let the lower import wedge rise to the level of the
higher import wedge in each sector − but only for one country pair: the U.S. and
China. We perform this counterfactual because of the relatively large size of, and
disproportionate attention dedicated to, the U.S.-China trade imbalance. We only
provide a short summary of the findings here. Full details can be found in Appendix
A.4.
The change in trade barriers has an even more limited effect on the world interest
rate than in Section 5.2. Therefore, as before, countries’ overall trade balances remain
virtually unchanged. The U.S.-China imbalance declines slightly relative to U.S. GDP
− once again because trade-cost change rebalances Chinese MRTs “inward”. To a first-
order, the welfare effects of this very stylised U.S.-China “trade war” are limited to
the U.S. and China. Chinese real GDP and consumption decline by .6%, while U.S.
real GDP and consumption decline by less than .1%.
6 Conclusion
We use a dynamic quantitative trade model to match the observed aggregate trade
balances, sectoral expenditure and production shares, and sector-level bilateral trade
flows of 40 economies (and the rest of the world) in the 2010-14 period. Through a
static variance decomposition and fully-fledged counterfactuals, we show that a large
share of the variation in bilateral trade balances is the result of observed differences
in country’s aggregate trade balances, spending patterns and industrial structure.
However, over half of the variation cannot be accounted for without resorting to not
directly observable, “residual” asymmetries in trade wedges. If we interpret these
wedges as reflecting trade costs, the removal of the asymmetries implied by our cal-
ibration would have a significant effect on international trade patterns and welfare.
Three aspects of our findings are noteworthy. First, bilateral trade imbalances
regularly fuel political controversies between observers who regard them as a symp-
tom of unfair trade practices (which our calibration would capture as asymmetric
trade wedges) and observers who see them as a mere reflection of countries’ macroe-
conomic conditions (which our calibration would capture as differences in aggregate
trade balances). Our findings suggest that, in fact, more than a third of the vari-
ation in bilateral trade balances is due to well-documented differences in countries’
expenditures and industrial structures. This mundane, yet important explanation of
bilateral imbalances receives disproportionally little attention in the public discourse.
Second, the quantitatively significant role of asymmetric trade wedges raises the
question what exactly these asymmetries capture. Our first-pass analysis does not
yield any evidence that they are systematically related to geography, trade agreements
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or the institutional environment of countries’ trade relationships. This, together with
the fact that wedges are obtained as a residual in our calibration, suggests that they
simply reflect an aspect of trade patterns our model or data are not rich enough to
explain. Since our work suggests that this aspect is significant from a positive and
welfare standpoint, unpacking trade-wedge asymmetries emerges as an important
objective for future research.
Third, whatever the origins of asymmetric trade wedges, our counterfactuals imply
that they have very little impact on aggregate trade surpluses and deficits. In our
model, the aggregate trade balance is primarily determined by macroeconomic factors
− such as country’s savings preferences and the world interest rate− upon which trade
policy only has a second-order effect. Therefore, a country which reduces a specific
bilateral trade deficit by raising import barriers on the respective trade partner, in
addition to lowering consumer welfare, is only likely to see its deficits with other trade
partners grow.
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|Mn′nt −Mnn′t| /
(
M
1/2
nntM
1/2
n′n′t
)
# obs. mean st. dev. 10th pctl. median 90th pctl.
820 .645 .620 .081 .463 1.441
Table 1: Bilateral trade imbalances: 40 countries and Rest of the World
Mn′nt represents the total spending by country n on goods and services from n′ in period t. All
data is based on WIOD (2016 release), average for the years 2010-14. The data covers 40 individual
economies and the rest of the world.
Object Data
ξ = .13 (life expectancy: 60 years)
δ = .06
γ = 1.044 (PWT: 1985-2014)
R = 1.030 (King and Low, 2014: 1985-2014)
{ρn}n match {NXnt/fnkαnn Hnt}n (WIOD)
{αn}n match 1− country-n labour share (PWT)
{ηn}n match {kn}n (PWT)
{σsn}s,n match country-n, sector-s spending share (WIOD)
{µsn}s,n match country-n, sector-s input share (WIOD)
{θs}s
match trade elasticities (Caliendo and Parro, 2015;
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014): Table A.2
{Zsn/ZsUSA}s,n 6=USA, match sector-level bilateral trade flows (WIOD){
τsn′n/
(
τ
1/2
sn′n′τ
1/2
snn
)}
s,n′,n
{ZsUSA}s match {yn}n (PWT){τsnn}s,n
Table 2: Calibration Overview
For parameter definitions, see Section 2. The data sources and calibration strategy are described in
detail in Section 3.
|ln τn′n − ln τnn′ |
# obs. mean st. dev. 10th pctl. median 90th pctl.
820 .079 .067 .011 .063 .528
Table 3: Calibration-implied asymmetries in trade wedges
τn′n represents the ad-valorem equivalent of the calibrated weighted average trade wedge applying
to imports by country n from n′, as defined in equation (23). Calibrations are based on data from
PWT 9.0 and WIOD (2016 release), average for the years 2010-14. The data covers 40 individual
economies and the rest of the world.
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Dep. var.: |ln τn′n − ln τnn′ |
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log dist. .010*** (.002) .009***(.002) .011**(.005) .005 (.007)
contiguous -.008 (.008) -.014 (.009) -.013 (.010) -.014 (.011)
com. lang. .003 (.015) .002 (.015) .010 (.016)
colonial .022 (.018) .024 (.019) .030* (.016)
com. curr. -.008 (.006) -.005*** (.007) -.006 (.009)
FTA .015 (.011) -.001 (.012)
EU -.013* (.007) .013 (.012)
country F.E. No No No Yes
# obs. 780 780 780 780
R2 .03 .04 .07 .22
* p < .10; ** p < .05; ***p < .01;
Table 4: Asymmetries in trade wedges and gravity variables
Robust standard errors in parentheses. τn′n represents the ad-valorem equivalent of the calibrated
weighted average trade wedge applying to imports by country n from n′, as defined in equation
(23). Calibrations are based on data from PWT 9.0 and WIOD (2016 release), average for the
years 2010-14. The data covers 40 individual economies and the rest of the world, but the rest of
the world is not included in the regression analysis. “Log dist.” is the log of population-weighted
distance between countries n′ and n; “contiguous” is a dummy which takes value 1 if n′ and n share
a common border, 0 otherwise; “com. lang” is a dummy which takes value 1 if n′ and n share an
official language, 0 otherwise; “colonial” is a dummy which takes value 1 if n′ and n share a colonial
history, 0 otherwise; “com. curr.” is a dummy which takes value 1 if n′ and n share a currency, 0
otherwise; “FTA” is a dummy which takes value 1 if n′ and n are parties to a free-trade agreement,
0 otherwise; “EU” is a dummy which takes value 1 if n′ and n are both EU members, 0 otherwise.
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Figure 1: U.S. bilateral trade balances, 2010-2014
“Net exports (% GDP)” refers to the total net exports of the United States vis-à-vis the horizontal-
axis country, expressed as a percentage of U.S. GDP. All data is based on WIOD (2016 release),
average for the years 2010-14.
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Figure 2: Bilateral trade balances for 40 economies, 2010-2014
“Net exports (% GDP)” refers to the total net exports of the horizontal-axis country vis-à-vis a
specific trade partner (blue dot) or the average trade partner (black dot), expressed as a percentage
of the horizontal-axis country’s GDP. All data is based on WIOD (2016 release), average for the
years 2010-14.
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Figure 3: Approximated and actual trade imbalances
“Data imbalances” refers to (Mn′nt −Mnn′t) / (MnntMn′n′t)1/2, where Mn′nt represents the total
spending by country n on goods and services from n′ in period t. “Approximation” is the first-order
linear approximation of this term, described in expression (19). All data is based on WIOD (2016
release), average for the years 2010-14. The data covers 40 economies and the rest of the world.
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Figure 4: Variance decomposition
In each panel, the horizontal-axis variable is the first-order linear approximation of
(Mn′nt −Mnn′t) / (MnntMn′n′t)1/2, where Mn′nt represents the total spending by country n on
goods and services from n′ in period t. The vertical-axis variable is one each of the four right-hand-
side terms in expression (19). The red line represents the line of best fit, whose respective slope is
also printed in red. All data is based on WIOD (2016 release), average for the years 2010-14. The
data covers 40 individual economies and the rest of the world.
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Figure 5: Model-implied trade-wedge asymmetries in U.S. bilateral trade
Each bar represents ln τnUSA − ln τUSAn, where τn′n is the ad-valorem equivalent of the calibrated
weighted average trade wedge applying to imports by country n from n′, as defined in equation (23),
and n is the horizontal-axis country. Calibrations are based on data from PWT 9.0 and WIOD
(2016 release), average for the years 2010-14.
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Figure 6: Bilateral imbalances under global trade-wedge symmetry
“Data imbalances” refers to (Mn′nt −Mnn′t) / (MnntMn′n′t)1/2, where Mn′nt represents the total
spending by country n on goods and services from n′ in period t. “Counterfactual imbalances” refers
to the corresponding term in the counterfactual steady state in which all bilateral trade wedges are
made symmetric, as described in Section 5.2. The red line represents the line of best fit, whose
respective slope is also printed in red. All data is based on WIOD (2016 release), average for the
years 2010-14. The data covers 40 economies and the rest of the world.
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Figure 7: Average outward-inward MRT gap under global trade-wedge symmetry
Bars represent the weighted average gap between the outward and inward MRT for the horizontal-
axis country, as defined in equation (25). “Initial” refers to the steady state of our calibrated model.
“Counterfactual” refers to the counterfactual steady state in which all bilateral trade wedges are
made symmetric, as described in Section 5.2. Calibration on data from PWT 9.0 and WIOD (2016
release), average for the years 2010-14.
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Figure 8: Aggregate trade balances under global trade-wedge symmetry
Bars represent the aggregate net exports of the horizontal-axis country, expressed as a percentage of
GDP. “Data” refers to actual net exports. “Counterfactual” refers to net exports in the counterfactual
steady state in which all bilateral trade wedges are made symmetric, as described in Section 5.2.
Calibration on data from PWT 9.0 and WIOD (2016 release), average for the years 2010-14.
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Figure 9: Variance decomposition under global trade-wedge symmetry
In each panel, the horizontal-axis variable is the first-order linear approximation of
(Mn′nt −Mnn′t) / (MnntMn′n′t)1/2, where Mn′nt represents the total spending by country n on
goods and services from n′ in period t. The vertical-axis variable is one each of the four right-hand-
side terms in expression (19). The red line represents the line of best fit, whose respective slope
is also printed in red. Counterfactual steady state with symmetric trade wedges for 40 individual
economies and the rest of the world in 2010-14, as described in Section 5.2.
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Figure 10: Impact of global trade-wedge symmetry on real GDP and consumption
Log change in real per-capita GDP and consumption relative to data in a counterfactual steady in
which all bilateral trade wedges are made symmetric, as described in Section 5.2. Calibration on
data from PWT 9.0 and WIOD (2016 release), average for the years 2010-14.
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Figure 11: U.S. bilateral trade balances under global trade-wedge symmetry
“Net exports (% GDP)” refers to the total net exports of the United States vis-à-vis the horizontal-
axis country, expressed as a percentage of U.S. GDP. “Data” refers to actual bilateral net exports.
“Counterfactual” refers to bilateral net exports in the counterfactual steady state in which all bilateral
trade wedges are made symmetric, as described in Section 5.2. Calibration on data from PWT 9.0
and WIOD (2016 release), average for the years 2010-14.
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A Appendix
A.1 Dynamic Model
A.1.1 Agents’ Optimality
The utility maximisation problem of an agent born in t′ can be written as
max
{Cnt(t′)}∞t=t′
∞∑
t=t′
(
1− ξ
1 + ρn
)t−t′
lnCnt (t
′) (27)
subject to
PCntCnt (t
′) + P IntInt (t
′) +Bnt+1 (t′) = wntHnt +
rnt
1− ξKnt (t
′) +
Rt
1− ξBnt (t
′) , (28)
Knt+1 (t
′) = Int (t′) + (1− δ)Knt (t′) , (29)
Knt′ (t
′) = Bnt′ (t′) = 0, (30)
where Int (t′) is the agent’s investment in t; Bnt (t′) denotes bond holdings; Knt (t′)
denotes capital holdings; PCnt is the final-consumption price level; P Int is the investment
price level; wnt is the wage rate; and rnt is the rental rate of capital in n. The resulting
Euler equation is
Cnt+1 (t
′)
Cnt (t′)
=
PCnt
PCnt+1
Rt+1
1 + ρn
, (31)
and the optimal portfolio requires
rnt+1 + P
I
nt+1 (1− δ)
P Int
= Rt+1. (32)
A.1.2 Steady-State Optimal Savings
In steady state, we can analytically characterise the consumption and savings de-
cisions of an agent born in period t′ as a function of their period-t asset and human
wealth:
PnCnt (t
′) =
ρn + ξ
(1− ξ) (1 + ρn)RAnt (t
′) +
R (ρn + ξ)
[R− γ (1− ξ)] (1 + ρn)wnHnt, (33)
Ant+1 (t
′) =
1
1 + ρn
RAnt (t
′) +
[R− γ (1 + ρn)] (1− ξ)
[R− γ (1− ξ)] (1 + ρn)wnHnt. (34)
Define Ant ≡ (1− ξ)−1
∑t
t′=−∞ ξ (1− ξ)t−t
′
Ant (t
′) . Then,
ant+1 =
1− ξ
γ
[
R
1 + ρn
ant +
R− γ (1 + ρn)
[R− γ (1− ξ)] (1 + ρn)wn
]
, (35)
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where ant ≡ Ant/Hnt. There is a stationary distribution of assets in steady state as
long as 1−ξ
1+ρn
R
γ
< 1. In that case,
Ant =
(1− ξ) [R− γ (1 + ρn)] (1− αn)
[γ (1 + ρn)−R (1− ξ)] [R− γ (1− ξ)]fnK
αn
nt H
1−αn
nt , (36)
PnCnt =
γξ (ρn + ξ)R (1− αn)
[γ (1 + ρn)−R (1− ξ)] [R− γ (1− ξ)]fnK
αn
nt H
1−αn
nt . (37)
A.1.3 Steady-State Net Exports
In steady state,
Knt =
αn
ηnPn (R− 1 + δ)fnK
αn
nt H
1−αn
nt . (38)
This in turn implies
ηnPnInt =
αn (γ − 1 + δ)
R− 1 + δ fnK
αn
nt H
1−αn
nt . (39)
From the definition of GDP,
fnK
αn
nt H
1−αn
nt = PnCnt + ηnPnInt +NXnt. (40)
This, together with (37) and (39), gives us the steady-state trade balance.
A.2 Approximating Bilateral Trade Imbalances
Rewrite equation (13) as
Msn′nt =
(
τsn′n
Osn′Psn
)−θs
qsn′σsn
pnQntpn′Qn′t∑
n pnQnt
(
1− NXnt
pnQnt
)
, (41)
where Mn′n ≡
∑
sMsn′n. Then,
Msn′nt
M
1
2
n′ntM
1
2
nn′t
=
(
Msn′ntMsnn′t
Mn′ntMnn′t
) 1
2
(
1−NXnt/pnQnt
1−NXn′t/pn′Qn′t
) 1
2
×
×
(
qsn′σsn
qsnσsn′
) 1
2
(
τsn′n
τsnn′
)− θs
2
(
OsnPsn′
Osn′Psn
)− θs
2
. (42)
Using a first-order Taylor approximation around the point
(
ln Ω1, ln Ω2, ln Ω
1/θs
3 , ln Ω
1/θs
4
)
,
we can write
Msn′nt
M
1
2
n′ntM
1
2
nn′t
[
ln
(
1−NXnt/pnQnt
1−NXn′t/pn′Qn′t
)
, ln
(
qsn′σsn
qsnσsn′
)
, ln
(
τsn′n
τsnn′
)
, ln
(
OsnPsn′
Osn′Psn
)]
≡
37
(
Msn′nMsnn′
Mn′nMnn′
) 1
2
e
1
2
ln
(
1−NXnt/pnQnt
1−NXn′t/pn′Qn′t
)
+ 1
2
ln
(
qsn′σsn
qsnσsn′
)
− θs
2
ln
(
τsn′n
τsnn′
)
− θs
2
ln
(
OsnPsn′
Osn′Psn
)
=
'
(
Msn′nMsnn′
Mn′nMnn′
) 1
2
(
Ω1Ω2
Ω3Ω4
) 1
2
{
1 +
1
2
[
ln
(
1−NXnt/pnQnt
1−NXn′t/pn′Qn′t
)
− ln Ω1
]
+
+
1
2
[
ln
(
qsn′σsn
qsnσsn′
)
− ln Ω2
]
− θs
2
[
ln
(
τsn′n
τsnn′
)
− ln Ω
1
θs
3
]
− θs
2
[
ln
(
OsnPsn′
Osn′Psn
)
− ln Ω
1
θs
4
]}
.
(43)
Hence,
nxn′n =
Mn′n −Mnn′
M
1
2
n′nM
1
2
nn′
= Ω
∑
s
(
Msn′nMsnn′
Mn′nMnn′
) 1
2
×
×
{
ln
(
1−NXnt/pnQnt
1−NXn′t/pn′Qn′t
)
+ ln
(
qsn′σsn
qsnσsn′
)
− θs ln
(
τsn′n
τsnn′
)
− θs ln
(
OsnPsn′
Osn′Psn
)}
,
(44)
where Ω ≡ [Ω1Ω2/ (Ω3Ω4)]1/2 .
Let nˆxn′n denote the data analogue of equation (44). Then,
Cov (nxn′n, nˆxn′n)
V ar (nˆxn′n)
= Ω
Cov
(nxn′n
Ω
, nˆxn′n
)
V ar (nˆxn′n)
.
We can now choose a point Ω such that
Cov (nxn′n, nˆxn′n)
V ar (nˆxn′n)
= 1.
Note, however, that this is merely a presentationally convenient normalisation, which
has no substantive impact on the any of the quantitative results presented in Section
4.2.
A.3 Variance Decomposition for 1995-1999
A.3.1 Data
To compile the data for 1995-1999 decomposition of the variation in bilateral im-
balances, we proceed as described in Section 3 − with one exception: we use the
2013 release of WIOD (whose data tables start in 1995), instead of the 2016 release
(whose data tables start in 2000). The data allow us to aggregate trade and spending
values to the same 31 sectors as described in Section 3.1 (and shown in Table A1).
However, in the 2013 release Croatia, Norway and Switzerland are not covered as
individual countries but grouped with the “rest of the world”. For this reason, the
1995-1999 data only cover 37 individual countries and the rest of the world, which
yields (38× 37/2 =) 703 distinct bilateral trade balances.
[Insert Figure A1 here]
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Figure A1 correlates the bilateral trade balances available in both periods with
one another, using only the 703 surpluses for 1995-1999. The figure indicates that
there is a fairly high degree of persistence: the correlation of the 1995-99 surplus with
the 2010-14 value of the same trade balance is .36. Moreover, more than two thirds
of the bilateral balances which were in surplus in 1995-1999 were still in surplus in
2010-14.
A.3.2 Variance Decomposition
Figure A2 is the analogue for the 1995-1999 period of Figure 4 in the main text. The
quantitative results of the variance decomposition are remarkably similar.
[Insert Figure A2 here]
Variation in countries’ aggregate trade balances accounts for 3% of the variation in
bilateral trade balances. Differences in production and spending patterns (“triangular
trade”) account for 9.5% of the variation, and asymmetric trade wedges account for
35%. The remaining 52% are due to variation in the ratio of outward to inward MRTs.
A.4 U.S.-China Trade Wedge Symmetry
This section reports more detailed results for our second trade-cost counterfactual, in
which we impose trade-wedge symmetry for the U.S. and China only. We do this by
letting the lower import wedge rise to the level of the higher import wedge in each
sector for all U.S.-China trade wedges.
[Insert Figure A3 here]
Figure A3 shows that, as with our global trade-wedge-symmetry counterfactual,
the change in trade costs has the effect of narrowing the average gap of outward to
inward MRTs across countries. Unsurprisingly, this effect is much smaller than in
our first counterfactual. It is, however, noteworthy that the effect is larger for some
third countries − notably, Ireland and Taiwan − than it is for the U.S. and China
themselves.
[Insert Figure A4 here]
As can be seen from Figure A4, the effect on aggregate trade balances remains
imperceptible. Figure A5 documents that the U.S.-China trade imbalance shrinks
somewhat. This reduction is smaller than in our first counterfactual − but yet again,
it is the result of decline in the gap between China’s outward and inward MRT.
[Insert Figure A5 here]
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The welfare effects of the rise in trade-barrier is largely confined to the U.S. and
China. Figure A6 reports that real GDP and consumption decline by .6% for China,
and by less than .1% for the U.S. There are third-country effects, but these are
vanishingly small in magnitude.
[Insert Figure A6 here]
A.5 Supplementary Tables
WIOD (2016) Final data
Country Code Country Code
Australia AUS Australia AUS
Austria AUT Austria AUT
Belgium BEL Belgium BEL
Brazil BRA Brazil BRA
Bulgaria BGR Bulgaria BGR
Canada CAN Canada CAN
China CHN China CHN
Croatia HRV Croatia HRV
Cyprus CYP Rest of the World RoW
Czech Republic CZE Czech Republic CZE
Denmark DNK Denmark DNK
Estonia EST Estonia EST
Finland FIN Finland FIN
France FRA France FRA
Germany DEU Germany DEU
Greece GRC Greece GRC
Hungary HUN Hungary HUN
India IND India IND
Indonesia IDN Indonesia IDN
Ireland IRL Ireland IRL
Italy ITA Italy ITA
Japan JPN Japan JPN
WIOD (2016) Final data
Country Code Country Code
Korea KOR Korea KOR
Latvia LVA Latvia LVA
Lithuania LTU Lithuania LTU
Luxembourg LUX Rest of the World RoW
Malta MLT Rest of the World RoW
Mexico MEX Mexico MEX
Netherlands NLD Netherlands NLD
Norway NOR Norway NOR
Poland POL Poland POL
Portugal PRT Portugal PRT
Rest of the World RoW Rest of the World RoW
Romania ROU Romania ROU
Russia RUS Russia RUS
Slovakia SVK Slovakia SVK
Slovenia SVN Slovenia SVN
Spain ESP Spain ESP
Sweden SWE Sweden SWE
Switzerland CHE Switzerland CHE
Taiwan TWN Taiwan TWN
Turkey TUR Turkey TUR
U.K. GBR U.K. GBR
U.S. USA U.S. USA
Table A1: Country sample
The “WIOD (2016)” column shows countries and regions as covered in the 2016 release of WIOD.
The “Final data” column shows countries and regions as grouped for our analysis.
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WIOD (2016) Final data
Sector
ISIC New
2-dg. code
Crop and animal production... 1 1
Forestry and logging 2 1
Fishing and aquaculture 3 1
Mining and quarrying 5-9 2
Manufacture of food products,... 10-12 3
Manufacture of textiles,... 13-15 4
Manufacture of wood and... 16 5
Manufacture of paper and... 17 6
Printing and reproduction... 18 6
Manufacture of coke and... 19 7
Manufacture of chemicals... 20 8
Manufacture of basic pharma... 21 8
Manufacture of rubber and... 22 9
Manufacture of other non-metal... 23 10
Manufacture of basic metals 24 11
Manufacture of fabricated metal... 25 11
Manufacture of computer,... 26 13
Manufacture of electrical equip... 27 13
Manufacture of machinery and... 28 12
Manufacture of motor vehicles,... 29 14
Manufacture of other transport... 30 14
Manufacture of furniture; other... 31-32 15
Repair and installation... 33 15
Electricity, gas, steam and... 35 16
Water collection, treatment... 36 16
Sewerage; waste collection,... 37-39 16
Construction 41-43 17
Wholesale and retail... 45 18
WIOD (2016) Final data
Sector ISIC New
2-dg. code.
Wholesale trade, except... 46 18
Retail trade, except of... 47 19
Land transport and... 49 21
Water transport 50 22
Air transport 51 23
Warehousing and support... 52 24
Postal and courier activities 53 25
Accommodation and food... 55-56 20
Publishing activities 58 6
Motion picture, video and... 59-60 6
Telecommunications 61 25
Computer programming,... 62-63 28
Financial service activities,... 64 26
Insurance, reinsurance and... 65 26
Activities auxiliary to financial... 66 26
Real estate activities 68 27
Legal and accounting activities;... 69-70 28
Architectural and engineering... 71 28
Scientific research and... 72 28
Advertising and market research 73 28
Other professional, scientific... 74-75 28
Administrative and support... 77-82 28
Public administration and... 84 31
Education 85 29
Human health and social work... 86-88 30
Other service activities 90-96 31
Activities of households... 97-98 28
Activities of extraterritorial... 99 31
Table A2: Sector sample
The “WIOD (2016)” column shows sector names and codes as covered in the 2016 release of WIOD.
The “Final data” column shows the new codes for the sector groups created for our analysis.
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Final data
New code Sector Trade elasticity
1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 8.11
2 Mining and quarrying 15.72
3 Food, beverages and tobacco 2.55
4 Textiles and textile products; leather, leather apparel and footwear 5.56
5 Wood and products of wood and cork 10.83
6 Pulp, paper; paper, printing and publishing 9.07
7 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 51.08
8 Chemicals and chemical products 4.75
9 Rubber and plastics 1.66
10 Other non-metallic, mineral products 2.76
11 Basic metals and fabricated metal 7.99
12 Electrical and optical equipment 10.60
13 Machinery, nec 1.52
14 Transport equipment 0.37
15 Manufacturing, nec; recycling 5
16 Electricity, gas and water supply 5
17 Construction 5
18 Wholesale trade, commission trade, including motor vehicles and motorcycles 5
19 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 5
20 Hotels and restaurants 5
21 Inland transport 5
22 Water transport 5
23 Air transport 5
24 Other supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 5
25 Post and telecommunications 5
26 Financial intermediation 5
27 Real estate activities 5
28 Other business activities 5
29 Education 5
30 Health and social work 5
31 Public admin, defence, social security and other public services 5
Table A3: Sector sample and trade elasticities
“New code” shows the new codes for the sector groups created for our analysis. “Sector” shows the
corresponding sector names. “Trade elasticity” shows the corresponding trade elasticities. Trade
elasticities are based on Caliendo and Parro (2015), and Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014).
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Figure A1: Bilateral trade imbalances, 2010-14 versus 1995-1999
“Bilateral imbalance” refers to (Mn′nt −Mnn′t) / (MnntMn′n′t)1/2, where Mn′nt represents the
total spending by country n on goods and services from n′ in period t. On the horizontal axis, all
values are the average for the 2010-14 period. On the vertical axis, all values are the average for the
1995-1999 period. The 2010-14 data is based on WIOD (2016 release), the 1995-99 data on WIOD
(2013 release). The chart covers 37 individual economies.
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Figure A2: Variance decomposition for 1995-1999
In each panel, the horizontal-axis variable is the first-order linear approximation of
(Mn′nt −Mnn′t) / (MnntMn′n′t)1/2, where Mn′nt represents the total spending by country n on
goods and services from n′ in period t. The vertical-axis variable is one each of the four right-hand-
side terms in expression (19). The red line represents the line of best fit, whose respective slope is
also printed in red. All data is based on WIOD (2013 release), average for the years 1995-99. The
data covers 37 individual economies and the rest of the world.
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Figure A3: Average outward-inward MRT gap under USA-CHN trade-wedge symmetry
Bars represent the weighted average gap between the outward and inward MRT for the horizontal-
axis country, as defined in equation (25). “Initial” refers to the steady state of our calibrated model.
“Counterfactual” refers to the counterfactual steady state in which USA-CHN bilateral trade wedges
are made symmetric, as described in Section 5.3. Calibration on data from PWT 9.0 and WIOD
(2016 release), average for the years 2010-14.
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Figure A4: Aggregate trade balances under USA-CHN trade-wedge symmetry
Bars represent the aggregate net exports of the horizontal-axis country, expressed as a percentage of
GDP. “Data” refers to actual net exports. “Counterfactual” refers to net exports in the counterfactual
steady state in which USA-CHN bilateral trade wedges are made symmetric, as described in Section
5.3. Calibration on data from PWT 9.0 and WIOD (2016 release), average for the years 2010-14.
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Figure A5: U.S. bilateral trade balances under USA-CHN trade-wedge symmetry
“Net exports (% GDP)” refers to the total net exports of the United States vis-à-vis the horizontal-
axis country, expressed as a percentage of U.S. GDP. “Data” refers to actual bilateral net exports.
“Counterfactual” refers to bilateral net exports in the counterfactual steady state in which USA-CHN
bilateral trade wedges are made symmetric, as described in Section 5.3. Calibration on data from
PWT 9.0 and WIOD (2016 release), average for the years 2010-14.
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Figure A6: Impact of USA-CHN trade-wedge symmetry on real GDP and consumption
Log change in real per-capita GDP and consumption relative to data in a counterfactual steady in
which USA-CHN bilateral trade wedges are made symmetric, as described in Section 5.3. Calibration
on data from PWT 9.0 and WIOD (2016 release), average for the years 2010-14.
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